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Abstract 
This article is a discussion of the ‘discourse on the unthinkable’ surrounding potential future 
democratic engagements with rivers as non-human persons or natural objects. In the context of the 
Asia-Pacific region, this article suggests that the developments in material philosophy entitled ‘new 
materialism’ are essential tools in the reconceptualization of rivers as democratic entities, but that 
local socio-historical conditions must also be taken into the account. In order to make its case, the 
article surveys the context for considering rivers as non-human persons in a juridical context, but 
also discusses the new material context that assists modern democracies in the renegotiation of the 
demos that forms the body politic of democracy—often in the face of neoliberal exploitation and a 
legacy of extremes in instrumentalism. The article argues the incorporation of water in the 
democratic project of enfranchisement is an essential exercise born of many western beliefs and 
ideals, but articulated uniquely at a regional and national level. 
 
Some of the terms commonly used to describe water—a supply, a resource, a service—hint at 
the limitations of our material imagination. Water has had many meanings to many cultures 
at many times—and ‘means’ cross culturally among contemporaries—and yet it has become 
strongly defined by its utility to human society. This revelation has increasingly dominated 
discourse around the topic of water management in recent years. Water managers may 
believe that the control of water is necessary for a more sustainable future. They may assert 
that they can prevent conflict and alleviate human suffering through the prevention of water-
based conflicts, present and future. They may claim that the future of environmental 
management depends on intergenerational equity, of meeting our needs today without 
inhibiting the ability of our descendants to meet theirs. All of these positions share the 
conviction that a new and human-oriented future is the goal, shaped in greater harmony with 
the environment.  
And yet, as this essay will argue, recent trends in philosophy from the movement 
known as ‘new materialism’ suggest that although the future of environmental management 
lies in human perception, it is a human perception of non-human agency that must be 
approached, interrogated, and ultimately built into the juridical and philosophical 
underpinnings of western liberal democracy. It is a trend that can remediate the excesses of 
neoliberal thought, and serve as a conceptual aid to much needed reform. For the Asia-Pacific 
region, these changes mingle and synergise with unique cultural, political, and philosophical 
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traditions to create something new beyond the restrictive boundaries of the past. This essay 
proposes a global perspective, but one that touches upon this unique context. By exploring 
some of the emerging legal precedents and philosophical trends that affect the juridical status 
of natural objects in the twenty-first century, this article offers a new viewpoint for water 
scholars operating in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 
What, then, are the unique implications of this global process for the Asia-Pacific 
region? In December 2007, the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukada opened the first Asia-
Pacific Water Summit by quoting the eighteenth-century Japanese scholar Hayashi Shihei, 
who wrote that “the waters flowing under Nihombashi in Edo and the waters in the rivers in 
China and Holland are one stream without any barrier” (APWS 2008: 28). The Prime 
Minister pointed out that Shihei wrote these words to warn Japan of the risk faced from then-
alien foreign influences, and yet twenty-first century Japan shares its problems with the Asia-
Pacific region, and the world. Thus it is for all Asia-Pacific nations: there are exceptional 
circumstances generated by culture, history, demography and bioregion, and yet part of a 
larger and fiercer regional and global water future. The solution to such a problem is a 
democratic conversation undertaken collectively not only between nations, but within the 
constituent groups found within a nation state.  
Water is not wholly passive, inert, or defined by utility, but an agent in a network of 
agents. In order to embrace this mode of thinking, it is essential that our thinking shift from 
what Fritjof Capra (1996: 10) has termed ‘self-assertive’ behaviours—domination, 
rationalisation, reductionism, linearity—towards ‘integrative’ behaviours—cooperation, 
partnership, synthesis, and nonlinearity. Commodification of water is a reflection of a wider 
trend in neo-liberal commodification, a function of economics and social interaction rather 
than an inevitable force. As Radin and Sunder (2005: 10) discuss, the forces that emerged in 
the 50s aided the seminal work of the Chicago school of economics assume that everything is 
inherently a commodity (used or unused) as a law of nature, even if the prices of different 
commodities exist implicitly “in the shadows”. It is this doctrine that must be contested for 
water to not always already be a commodity: just as we argue that there are borders to 
commodification for humans, so too must water be removed from its creep. This is especially 
relevant to the Asia-Pacific region, where first peoples fight to retain traditional definitions of 
what is off limits to commodification. 
Water is part of human culture, human religion, and daily life, and yet its influence is 
not a human invention. It is hydro-social, as Erik Swyngedouw (2009) has argued (see Linton 
and Budds 2014; Schmidt 2014 for new developments of the theory), an entity that is part of 
our social environment, performing a role that is more profound than is often realised. The 
part played by water in this environment is not wholly determined by human action, and 
cannot be regulated wholly by human economic theory. Recent advocates of conceptual 
change, such as those advocating deep ecology, argue that humanity is but a small part of a 
wider life-world, a world in which all living things are of equal inherent worth. This essay 
proposes that institutions of water governance must embrace this approach, but that the 
imagination of personhood, a form of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, has a role to 
play. 
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By reaching beyond the science, jurisprudence, and sociology of water studies and 
into its material philosophy, I propose, water studies and management tap into a great vein of 
knowledge that enriches our environmental relationships and imbues natural objects such as 
rivers with an agency that both protects their ontological parity and provides a familiar 
interface for political action. A plurality of human relationships with water go beyond its 
utility, and thus the management of water must also go beyond the limitations of the term 
‘resource’. Water has become a commodity, and yet it is possessed of traits that raise some 
troubling questions about prevailing political beliefs. Should a body of water be entitled to 
rights? What rights should be granted? And perhaps most troubling of all, do these rights 
entitle a body of water to be considered a person?  
Firstly, what do we mean by a ‘right’? Jack Donnelly (2013: 8) defines rights as rule-
governed interactions centred on, or under the control of, a right-bearer. The bearer has a 
right to a thing with respect to a duty-bearer, and the rules enforce who is entitled to claim a 
right, what the entitlement is, and which parties have a duty to ensure that the right is 
enforced. Rights are, as Donnelly (2013: 1) asserts before attempting to define them, 
“historically specific and contingent”. The identity of the right-bearer, the nature of their 
right, and the correlative obligation of the duty-bearer shift with time. Both the ability of 
water to hold rights and associated personhood must be interrogated for, as Donnelly (2013: 
9) points out, “we talk about rights only when they are at issue”. Both the identification of 
natural rights and the identification of the transformation of certain human parties from 
consumers to duty-infringers is a contestation of the rules, and a historical shift of actants 
within the transaction of these rules 
Legal systems may be willing to accept that all living entities have a moral status—
and possible rights—but are they willing to act on this belief on human terms, to bring the 
democracy of objects into the political ecology? Can the anthropocene epoch experienced by 
the democratic world tolerate more agential actors, and what are the implications for legal 
regimes and frameworks? The answers to these questions have a profound impact on the 
nature of democracy, for humanity runs the risk of disenfranchising entities that are deserving 
of protection from molestation and harm at the hands of the powerful. As has been the case in 
the past, reassessment of rights often leads to disturbing but ultimately productive 
conclusions.  
If those with power over water are to create a future political and economic system 
that is truly just and equitable, then they are morally obligated to critique our understanding 
of natural objects as democratic entities. Conflict generated by a plurality of values takes 
place within and between groups of individuals, and within and between different political 
entities with often conflicting environmental values. In all of these conflicts, the future of 
environmental thought must be more than an argument between human actors (Smith 2003: 
5). Jamie Linton and Jessica Budds (2014: 179) have recently elaborated upon the hydro-
social cycle theory to explore the process of how “water is made known”, how it absorbs 
social relations, power structures and technological interventions which shape society in turn, 
and how water and society co-produce new hydro-social arrangements. In so doing, they 
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reiterate the assertion, which I repeat, that discovering the manner in which democratic 
deficits and inequalities are produced through water is key to future reform. 
Recent years have seen several notable attempts to reassess water beyond its role as a 
passive and inert element. These include studies from a multi-disciplinary water management 
perspective (Leybourne and Gaynor 2006), an anthropological perspective (Strang 2009) a 
philosophical perspective (Macauley 2010), a historical perspective (Linton 2010), and a 
socio-ecological phenomenon (Chen et al. 2013), to name but a few. In another co-authored 
publication, I have argued for the narrative legacy of pre-modern water management for the 
twenty-first century (Morgan and Smith 2013). The renegotiation of the relationship between 
humanity and its water supply is under way, and the collection of essays in this volume 
approaches this renegotiation from the perspective of socio-politics. Water is both the catalyst 
for political conflict and human suffering and the victim of human mismanagement in a 
constantly shifting cycle, with mismanagement breeding conflict and conflict breeding 
mismanagement. In order to break this vicious cycle, a reassessment of political identity is 
required. Michael Mason has proposed that a global institutional and civil society framework 
is emerging around “established democratic institutions and standards of fairness which 
suggest…a more inclusive and effective consideration of environmental interests” (Mason 
1999: 214). Through the democracy of objects, justice is enhanced and rights expanded so 
that all may benefit, human and non-human. 
Precedents in the Democratic Treatment of River Systems 
The modern intellectual framework is shifting every day as it struggles to re-evaluate our 
place on this planet, and the future treatment of environment.  A struggle takes place at local, 
national, regional and international level to develop systems of ideation that are cooperative 
and pan-national, but also culturally appropriate. Water has become implicated in this 
process, for it is malleable and yet extremely easy to mismanage. Much of this 
mismanagement has occurred due to the misapplication of ideas (scientific, philosophical, or 
political) outside of their appropriate context, and the solution must avoid the same mistake. 
Water brings life and yet engenders conflict; it allows agriculture and yet carries toxic runoff 
throughout diverse ecosystems and biospheres. All peoples share in the risks and rewards, 
and yet the solution is more complex than unilateralism or localism. The philosophical focus 
has shifted from a feeling of hydraulic mastery to an uncertainty, a sense that the fate of 
humanity is intermingled with that of water in a manner not fully understood. Water has 
moved from abstraction into a very real permeation of consciousness, as Jamie Linton (2010: 
6) argues: 
No longer taking water for granted in a material sense, we have also begun 
to think about water in a different way. Water is now more complicated than it seemed 
in the mid-twentieth century. In modern times water has most commonly been 
thought of as a resource that could be considered and managed in abstraction from the 
wider environmental, social, and cultural context(s) in which it occurred. Today, 
however, water is complicated by (and co-implicated with) these contextual 
circumstances. 
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The potential consequences of this co-implication are particularly significant in the realm of 
political action, bioethics, and jurisprudence. Further tools are needed to aid in the 
confrontation of our future water democracies. In this essay, I present a case for the treatment 
of river systems in a more democratic fashion, as discrete entities deserving of certain rights, 
privileges, and protections under the law. The western intellectual tradition has a historical 
and a theoretical legacy that are both the cause, and the partial solution, to the mistreatment 
of water resources. There is great potential for compromises and redefinitions in the issue of 
water as a democratic entity. Water is an actor within a political ecology, a participant in a 
complex series of interactions that influence human life on a civic and individual level. 
Natural entities are actors in this ecology, and greater awareness of their powers leads to 
more balanced human interactions with the environment. Natural objects occupy a position 
which may cause interaction and antagonism between human and non-human, as Paul 
Robbins describes: 
…following thinking in science studies and related fields, it is increasingly clear that 
non-humans are collaborators in complex relationships, influencing people and 
institutions and setting the terms of economic growth and political change. 
Conversely, however, the qualities of non-humans that are incongruent with state 
organization, capitalist accumulation, and various forms of social institutions cause 
them to resist or create friction with human activities, producing a different kind of 
political engagement (Robbins 2012: 232). 
When apprehended as an actor in a political ecology, it is increasingly clear that the 
democratic role of water has become divorced from its political potential. Water has the 
power to exert political power, and yet it lacks the representation and definition of a person 
that might allow it to do so. In the absence of this particular form of political agency water 
“flows to power”, as Erik Swyngedouw has boldly stated. Societies with power are never in 
want of water, for they have the means to exert influence over hydrological resources. The 
control of water, in turn, brings power (Swyngedouw, 2006: 57). But what if the power that 
drove water were not the power of humans, but the power of its own positive freedom, the 
power to remain intact, unmolested, and whole? It may seem implausible to advocate for the 
agency of natural objects such as rivers in an era when a vast number of human beings are 
denied rights and others flout their power. And yet, as this article argues, the advocacy of 
non-human personhood is not a replacement for human rights advocacy, but a 
complementary process in which both human enfranchisement and natural enfranchisement 
can be mutually supportive.  
Rivers have long been valued through myth, story, and allegory as non-human 
persons: they are participants in a story of creation and regeneration, actors in a global 
network of creative forces, and companions in life-worlds lacking a human monopoly on 
agency. These entities exist today in the cultures of many first peoples, in the cultural 
engagements of everyday life, in the histories of human interconnection with the hydrological 
cycle. This article seeks to place the modern quest for greater equity and justice within water 
policy within this tradition. Philosophy and critical theory, too, offer rich insights that bear 
scrutiny. The incipient trend in ‘new materialism’ within the humanities (philosophy, critical 
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theory, intellectual history) has highlighted the necessity for non-human agency and 
autonomous force in the face of degradation and exploitation. In her monograph Vibrant 
Matter, for example, political scientist Jane Bennett (2010: vii) has argued that a more 
nuanced understanding of what she terms the ‘vibrant materialism’ of objects is required in 
order to counteract the neoliberal idea of matter as “passive stuff, as raw, brute, or inert”.  
Rivers are one of the more obvious candidates for personhood: they are expansive, 
mysterious, powerful, and agential. They are complex but complete, balanced and yet 
changeable. Their flow metaphorically bonds us of our own bodies, the flow of blood in our 
veins. They are repositories of stories, myths, and culture. They have a powerful influence on 
human life for good or ill, wending through natural and political ecologies. Environmental 
Philosopher David Macauley has called for a recuperation of nature as a powerful and 
formative force by returning to certain pre-modern notions of interaction. In Macauley’s case, 
the interactions are those of the four Classical elements, Earth, Air, Fire, and Water. 
Macauley (2010: 2) calls for an anamnesis, a loss of forgetfulness, in our interaction with the 
environment: 
The elements often appear dimmed down or diminished as they enter the human 
domus. Although physically near, they nevertheless remain existentially remote, 
covered over, or concealed. One task, then, of ecological philosophy is to encourage a 
renewed understanding of and critical encounter with air, fire, earth, and water and to 
make us aware of the complex—and sometimes very necessary—mediations that exist 
between us and the environment, between humans and a more capacious world. 
The forgetfulness prompted by vast new discoveries in the sciences extends into many pre-
modern ideas, and the personification of rivers and their fellow natural entities is no 
exception. Just as western thinkers often have forgotten that the elements combine to shape 
our imagination and lives on a scale that is ecologically meaningful, so too is the population 
of nature with new ‘people’ a past idea that, when remembered, may be remediated and 
transformed in the present and in the future. Some cultures, however, have never forgotten. It 
is their precedent, coupled with developments in western thought, that can inspire democratic 
thought anew. 
When human beings are denied their rights, there is an implication of wrongdoing, of 
an undemocratic trend. Ignorance, hypocrisy, complacency, or naiveté may cause the 
privileged and powerful to ignore these breaches, but a sense of their injustice remains. For 
natural entities, there is a denial of agency so strong that many still struggle to comprehend 
the possibility of rights for nature comparable to our own, be they theoretical or in actuality. 
An abused person is a victim, and yet an abused environment is degraded. Humans often care 
about the destruction of natural entities, but because they are beautiful, unique, or 
irreplaceable. Modern observers care because their absence is a death sentence for the human 
race. They care because human quality of life is curtailed, and the future darkened. But what 
if contemporary societies could care because all persons, be they natural or juridical, are 
rights-bearing and thus deserving of protection? 
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The Riparian ‘Discourse on the Unthinkable’ 
In a 1972 article entitled ‘Should Trees have Standing?: Towards Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects’, Christopher D. Stone established an argument that was purely speculative, and yet 
based on promising developments in legal precedent. The article—still in print as of 2010 in a 
35th anniversary compilation by Oxford University Press—continues to serve as the seminal 
study on its subject matter. Natural objects such as trees, rivers, oceans and mountains should 
have rights under the law, become juridical persons in the manner of the corporation or 
government. Furthermore, as Stone’s expanded research (2010) revealed, other natural 
objects such as the climate and the ocean were worthy of consideration. Stone proposed an 
inchoate argument for a form of ‘Earth jurisprudence’, a reordering of political entities that 
places the rights of nature back into focus (Brenan 2013). Within western legal and moral 
discourse, Europeans once considered non-Europeans as inferior by virtue of Biblical 
narrative—thus morally justifying exploitation—and women were considered emotional and 
illogical by men—and thus not able to exercise the right to vote. Today many individuals and 
institutions struggle to apprehend natural objects as being eligible for moral status and its 
attendant rights, or able to benefit from them. The process is well underway, and yet new 
neoliberal thinking with its associated economic instrumentality threatens to drown out the 
voices of those opinions aired since the 1970s, when the debate began in earnest. 
The mechanistic worldview is persistent. If the New Materialist philosophies to be 
discussed below have something to teach us, it is that human beings are not the sole agents in 
our environment, nor is their distinctness as corporeal entities unique. Humans have reserved 
these powers for themselves, and yet can no longer afford to discount the power of non-
human forces. The disbelief in non-human agency, fuelled with the mechanistic notions born 
from the Enlightenment, has created a catch twenty-two scenario. No rights without value, no 
value without rights: 
There is something of a seamless web involved: there will be resistance to giving the 
thing “rights” until it can be seen and valued for itself; yet, it is hard to see it and 
value it for itself until we can bring ourselves to give it “rights--which is almost 
inevitably going to sound inconceivable to a large group of people (Stone 1972: 9). 
Stone argued that “until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but 
a thing for the use of “us”—those who are holding rights at the time” (1972: 9). An object or 
entity remains a ‘thing’ until the possibility of it being enfranchised and protected by rights is 
no longer unthinkable. For us to believe that an entity might be deserving of rights and 
privileges similar to those enjoyed by natural persons such as human beings, it must first be 
conceded that it has agency, and that this agency is being infringed upon by our mistreatment 
of the entity. It is not enough to decry the pollution and ecological damage caused by 
environmental mismanagement because they negatively impact upon our lives: modern 
societies must move to a stage of thought in which they look upon these mistreatments as 
they would look upon the mistreatment of a human being.  
As Thomas Berry (1999: 82) put it, we must move away from the perception that the 
universe is a “collection of objects”, and towards to view that it is a “communion of 
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subjects”. Modernity must make the intellectual leap from the notion that all human life is 
deserving of legal protection, past the idea that entities such as animals have rights, and into a 
state of discourse in which natural objects may be included. Jamie Linton (2010: 7) has 
argued that water has a long history as a participant in our political thought-world, and yet 
continues to challenge us: 
…we cannot ignore water’s political dimensions, as marked by the distribution of 
economic benefits and affordances associated with particular modes of water 
governance. These various dimensions have always been present in water, of course. 
Now, however, the ecological, cultural, and political aspects of water present 
themselves to us in ways that challenge and defy our abstract understanding of 
water’s nature (Linton 2010: 7). 
Water as a political entity is in the process of being redefined. Rivers form an ideal case study 
in this discussion, for there is evidence that a reassessment of their role in our democratic 
imagination is underway. This precedent has moved beyond theory, and entered the realm of 
the law and of governance. The beliefs of traditional societies around the world retain a 
respect for, interaction with, and veneration of natural entities that has started to influence the 
dominant ideologies that have led to environmental degradation and, most recently, climate 
change. The answer, however, is a series of local stories that are often defined in terms of 
their interaction with local beliefs and cultural contexts.  
Global Precedents: Water Democracy in (In)Action 
In 2012, the New Zealand Ministry for treaty negotiations made a ruling that the Whanganui 
river, third longest in the country, was recognised by law as a legal person, individual and 
entitled to certain rights. This enshrined in law the aspiration of the 1999 Whanganui River 
Report that the river should be viewed as integrated and indivisible “in both biophysical and 
metaphysical terms from the mountains to the sea” (Record of Understanding 2011: 1.18.1). 
In this case, the river has become a juridical person deserving of rights by virtue of the 
cohesion of its parts into a legal whole. This is a positive step not only for the recognition of 
the Māori Whanganui Iwi as custodians of the river, but is a positive precedent for global 
democratic reform. Anthropologist Veronica Strang has recently argued that the case of New 
Zealand is an important precedent in the bioethical inclusion of indigenous voices into the 
conversation of water management: 
[A] more egalitarian bioethical position draws inspiration from some of the 
indigenous worldviews…in which the nonhuman is seen to have agency and power, 
and thus to occupy a collaborative position in relation to human societies. In the 
colonial appropriation of indigenous land and resources, such subaltern worldviews 
have been subsumed but, as the events [in New Zealand] illustrate, they resurface in 
debates about the ownership and management of water (Strang 2014: 121–122). 
New Zealand is a prime example of the struggle beginning to take place within the Asia-
Pacific region. Scholars such as Brad Coombes (Smith and Coombes 2012; Coombes 2013) 
and Gail Tipa (Tipa and Panelli 2009; Tipa and Nelson 2012) have explored struggles 
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between neoliberal shortcomings in urban planning and water management and Māori 
knowledge and beliefs, and proposed ways in which indigenous knowledge and agency can 
reshape the debate. Examples from other countries in the region demonstrate the emergence 
of local beliefs in the water management challenges and crises of the twenty-first century. In 
the Buddhist region of Ladakh in Northwest India, for examples, severe flash floods have 
been understood in the context of karmic retribution coupled with the retribution of an 
agentic and sentient landscape (Butcher, 2013). As Andrea Butcher (2013: 104–105) has 
argued, these local beliefs are a key part of large-scale solutions, and cannot be ignored: 
…narratives linking climate change with shamanic belief and pollution concerns help 
to reveal the localized and contextualized explanations of disaster and environmental 
management in transforming landscapes in ways that empirical ecology studies cannot 
accommodate. 
The local socio-religious contexts of diverse peoples have a direct effect on the reaction to 
and management of water. The question is this: how can these perspectives and beliefs be 
incorporated into legal and democratic responses? It is useful to observe an example of a 
democratic principle enshrined in law, tested in practice, and realised in the courts in a 
landmark decision. The Whanganui Iwi have guaranteed the future consideration of their 
river as a democratic entity, but we must turn to South America to see what such a decision 
can achieve with time.  
The Vilcabamba river in Equador has been protected from misuse as the result of a 
2008 constitutional reform mandating the legal rights of nature. This protection was tested in 
response to environmental degradation caused as a result of extensive road works undertaken 
by the Provincial Government of Loja. The defendant was accused of dumping large 
quantities of excavation material in the nearby river while excavating a large regional 
highway. The provincial court passed constitutional injunction 11121-2011-0010, 
establishing the need for the road works to be conducted on the basis of the precautionary 
principle, placing the burden of proof on the local authorities to demonstrate that they were 
not causing morally unacceptable harm that was scientifically plausible but uncertain (Beder 
2006: 48). The damage to the river was deemed to be irreversible and inequitable to future 
human generations, but was also deemed to be harmful to the continued existence of the 
river. The rights of the local population to proper infrastructure and the mandate of the local 
authorities to provide it were balanced against the rights of the river to integrity, the flow of 
which had been halved by careless and unregulated dumping (Greene 2011). 
By acquiring legally mediated access to representation, rights, and justice under the 
principles of liberal democracy long accorded to incorporated entities, the Whanganui and 
Vilcabamba rivers have gained powerful protection from the instrumentalist effects of 
neoliberal exploitation. A quasi-corporeal legal representation of hydrology has the ability to 
not only shape a more sustainable and culturally equitable relationship with riverine systems, 
but to counter the reduction of water into exploitable base components. Just as a corporation 
is able to act in a political ecology due to the collective juridical personhood of its constituent 
human members, so too must other rivers be legislated into personhood, joining those rivers 
10 
 
that are now classified among the ranks of the legally enfranchised. Water has a compelling 
case for personhood, a role that it has held de facto at many times in the past.  
For water to become a democratic person de jure, democratic societies must reassess 
their ethics when it comes to the classification of the people, the demos, whom they wish to 
include in their communities. If democracy—at its core, and independent of any particular 
permutation—promotes both opportunities for self-determination and moral autonomy 
(Diamond 1999: 3), then it should extend these affordances to new members. A solution by 
democratic means, however, is not simple: democracy is linked to the history of the very 
perversities that it seeks to address—the applicability of Western Democracy to a select few 
and its denial to others, its aggressive displacement of existing modes of social interaction—
and yet it has the capacity to remediate. It is also important to note that it was liberal 
democracy and its emphasis on individual freedom that enabled neoliberalism, its addiction 
to commodification, and its creation a flattened environment lacking in vitality. The vibrant 
materialism that Bennett seeks cannot be fostered by the same ideas that deadened matter in 
the first place. The assertion that we must “recover” vitality through the apparatus of the 
nation-state is a repetition of colonial discourse, and excludes traditions outside of this 
worldview (Schmidt 2014: 203).  Nor do all participants of a democracy have equal 
engagement in a world where resources buy influence in an environment of neoliberal 
“responsibilisation”, as Smith and Coombes (2012) demonstrate in the case of New Zealand’s 
environmental planning. Environmental responsibility should not be a function of personal 
agency alone. Democratic evolution must overcome these contradictions and perversities, and 
must involve the local positions and beliefs outlined by Strang (2014).  
South America would not be leading the world in radical legal re-definitions of nature 
were it not for unique national and regional political and cultural beliefs shaping democracy. 
Evolution requires the right to acknowledge and validate the autonomy of the non-human is 
an expression of culturally situated moral autonomy that is both shared by all democracies, 
but also drawn from diverse voices and knowledges. The stakes are high, and yet the leap in 
logic from human rights and democracy to non-human rights and democracy must cross a 
vast chasm. Only now, at the time of writing, has it become conceivable that non-human 
animals such as simians might be treated as legal persons, entitled to habeas corpus and 
fundamental rights of bodily liberty. The Nonhuman Rights project is arguing that “once 
[they] prove that chimpanzees are autonomous, that should be sufficient for them to gain 
legal personhood and at least have their fundamental interests protected by human rights” 
(BBC 2013). However, the NRP case for simians as non-human persons has recently hit a 
legal stumbling block in the USA with the 2014 ruling that Tommy the chimpanzee cannot be 
considered a legal person because “…unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any 
legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their 
actions” (BBC 2014 1). In Argentina, however, Sandra the orang-utan was recently released 
from captivity after being granted limited human rights (BBC 2014 2). Both cases have 
aroused suspicion and scepticism from the media and lawmakers alike, and yet it was a 
unique Argentine context that allowed Sandra to be emancipated where Tommy was 
disenfranchised. Simians, at least, have their human ties to protect them, a body of their own 
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to define them. Aqueous entities may not suffer pain and emotional trauma as animals do, 
and yet their autonomy is an equally valid indicator of their need for legal protection. In both 
cases, political action is required. In the case of water, decision makers must re-evaluate their 
very abstract imaginations before they are able to act, to discourse on the topic of the 
unthinkable. In this discourse, regional factors are key.  
Conversely, my argument here to scholars of and in the Asia-Pacific region is that the 
non-human rights of aqueous entities such as rivers as shaped not only by unique cultural 
phenomena, but by a global legal and philosophical struggle. In addition, the peculiar legacy 
of European colonialism and cultural influence in the region has left its mark on the water 
management framework, and that understanding the historical perversities and problems of a 
problem born from western thought offers the key to local solutions. The democracy of 
objects is the intellectual by-product of western intellectual history, and yet it offers a 
framework for culturally unique solutions. The rivers of thought that flow from the font of 
democratic history and tradition are the same as those that flow through the Asia-Pacific, and 
yet water management merges local solutions with global frameworks. Democracy is both a 
cause and a solution, but not in the way that those caught up in the logic of nation-states, 
economies, and human actors might believe. 
The Democracy of Objects: New Materialism as Political Intervention 
Recent shifts in the philosophy of environment have initiated a move of focus from the 
human relationship to a series of inert natural objects towards what Jane Bennett has termed a 
vibrant materialism. By acknowledging that matter is active and agential and not inert, 
philosophical discourse can shift the future of environmental democracy away from better 
utilisation of resources, and towards better co-existence within a political ecology consisting 
of many human and non-human actors. This is an essential context for our discussion of 
objects as non-human persons, for the first step in the reform of our democracy and 
jurisprudence must stem from a belief that natural objects are entities worthy of interface 
rather than use. This cannot occur until the majority recognise that environmental 
management goes beyond the neglect of natural resources in favour of neoliberal growth, and 
into the understanding that humans are not abusing ‘stuff’, but denying the existence of 
agency.  
 The birth of the problem—together with the problem of neoliberalism and 
commoditisation—lies in western humanism. As Graham Harman (2009: 59) discusses when 
exploring Bruno Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern, the tradition of humanism and of the 
enlightenment created a “Copernican” effect, placing humans in the centre of the ontological 
cosmos, making all other things “stupid robotic objects acting with clockwork mechanical 
torpor”. Latour proposed a counter-revolution, introducing Actor-Network theory as a denial 
of separation between human and object. A child of Latour in many ways, the trend in New 
Materialism has a great deal to teach us about the intermingling of bodies, and of identities, 
that constitute our political and natural environments. The production of new democratic and 
hydro-social patterns that overcome the enlightenment reification of the subject is a 
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philosophical solution that may be seen as a self-correction of European thinking on the 
matter. 
The realisation that the material environment infuses, influences, is the body, leads to 
a new form of environmental politics, a system in which nature must be recognised not only 
as a power, but as part of the human world at a level beyond the human scale of 
comprehension. Before it is possible that natural objects can be juridical persons, it must first 
be understood that they can be bodies, whole and integrated. Just as human bodies are 
conglomerations of parts working as an organism, so too are natural entities possessed of an 
integrity rendering them eligible for consideration in our democratic system. As Diana Coole 
and Samantha Frost have argued, a new materialist perspective forces us the reassess the 
political forces at work in out interactions with the environment: 
Paying attention to corporeality as a practical and efficacious series of emergent 
capacities thus reveals both the materiality of agency and agentic properties inherent 
in nature itself. Both have important implications for the way we understand political 
processes (Coole and Frost 2010: 20). 
Mindfulness of non-human objects as agents extends corporeality beyond that of our own 
human bodies alone, leading to consideration of the countless entities that populate and 
influence human life. The demos—the unit of interest and of influence within a democracy—
expands to include not only distinct and visible bodies, but the countless interactions that take 
place within. It is more than its parts, an irreducible whole. As a result, all actors within this 
demos must be accounted for as part of a collective will. The demos is not a fixed and 
codified set of actors, but a seething mass of natural objects, and the objects that compose 
these objects. This non-human world is not only made up of composite objects at a visible 
scale such as trees, rivers, or mountains, but on a vast continuum from the smallest atom to 
the vastest cosmic bodies: 
Consider, for example, the way [a materialist theory of democracy] imagines the 
being of the demos: not as a formed thing or fixed entity, but as an unruly activity or 
indeterminate wave of energy. The demos is, we read, “neither the sum of the 
population nor the disfavored element within,” but an “excess” irreducible to the 
particular bodies (Bennett 2010: 106). 
The alliances of elements that compose the discrete emergent wholes of objects, legal 
entities, and democratic corpora are irreducible: they cannot be ‘undermined’ to the atoms, 
molecules, and cells that make up their bodies, nor can they be dismissed as manifestations of 
a greater whole. They are a democracy of objects, each potent in diverse ways, each adding 
together to make a new form of democratic body, a composite alliance of forces. Legal 
personhood is an essential tool within such a world, for it collects assemblages of objects 
together into blocs that are both indivisible and plural. A river is indivisible and plural, just 
like the human body, for it is indivisible and plural by virtue of its ecological cohesion. As 
Jane Bennett argues, democratic humans act in alliance of this greater demos, and must learn 
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to think of political action in corporate terms. Not only are certain objects allied into a unified 
form, but our life on earth is likewise a conglomeration of human and non-human: 
If human culture is inextricably enmeshed with vibrant, nonhuman agencies, and if 
human intentionality can be agentic only if accompanied by a vast entourage of 
nonhumans, then it seems that the appropriate unit of analysis for democratic theory is 
neither the individual human nor an exclusively human collective but the 
(ontologically heterogeneous) “public” coalescing around a problem (Bennett 2010: 
108). 
Before humanity can move towards a historical understanding of personification and its 
future within environmental democracy, it must first break with the assumption that the 
human is the only subjects worthy of power. The practice of political power involves the 
imagination of what constitutes a political agent, and theorists such as Bennett are pushing at 
the boundaries of the categories managing our imagination of agency. The implication of this 
agentic expansion, it seems, is a shift from the centre of action away from the domain of the 
human being. Karen Barad has argued that this shift is the first step to a new politics of 
human and non-human: 
The specificity of intra-actions speaks to the particularities of the power imbalances of 
the complexity of a field of forces. I know that some people are very nervous about 
not having agency localized in the human subject, but I think that is the first step—
recognizing that there is not this kind of localization or particular characterization of 
the human subject is the first step in taking account of power imbalances, not an 
undoing of it (Barad 2012: 55). 
The question that looms in the case of water management is one of power, and of agency. 
How does an aqueous entity such as a river, lake, or underground aquifer fit into our political 
discourse? When decision makers attempt to answer such questions, it is essential for their 
priorities to be clear. Do they wish to manage environment, or do they wish to include 
environment in their decision making processes, to take account of its best interests as an 
intrinsic right? Levi Bryant reveals the stark reality of this decision: 
An activist political theory that places all its apples in the basket of content is doomed 
to frustration insofar as it will continuously wonder why its critiques of ideology fail 
to produce their desired or intended social change. Moreover, in an age where we are 
faced with the looming threat of monumental climate change, it is irresponsible to 
draw our distinctions in such a way as to exclude nonhuman actors (Bryant 2011: 24). 
Bryant makes a compelling point. If our democratic system fails to account for the influences 
of countless agents beyond the scope of the human, then political solutions will fail due to an 
ignorance of variables. Modern thinkers must understand some of the forces at work in the 
redefinition of environmental matter, and must also consider the network of interactions that 
blur the boundaries between human subject and natural object. If they fail to do so, they will 
be unable to implement policies, make political decisions, or postulate philosophical 
solutions that are true to our place in the life-world that surrounds us. Humanity may be 
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powerful and intentional, but it is not alone in its natural personhood. Finally, we would do 
well to note that the language of democracy as an apparatus of the nation-state is not an 
inevitable discourse, and is in fact a colonialist impulse that we would do well to avoid 
(Schmidt 2014: 230): listening to a wider democracy of object and a wider community of 
cultural beliefs means  
 I propose that the imagination of objects as non-human agents is greatly aided if 
democracy can adapt their agency into its current intellectual frameworks, to imagine their 
personhood. This is not an argument that natural objects such as rivers think or intend, but 
that they move, connect, act with such far-reaching political ramifications that human 
observers must imagine them as persons, rights-bearing, corporeally complete, and part of the 
demos of democracy. Those of us steeped in western thought have forgotten the possibility of 
this imagination, and thus the section to follow recuperates it through its history, alteration, 
and afterlives in the twenty-first century. For those beyond the West—in the Asia Pacific 
region, in this context—the solution lies not only in pan-national decision making, but also in 
the recuperation of cultural beliefs that enshrine the co-mingling of human and non-human, 
and the agency of the natural world. Perhaps, once the materialisms of the East and West 
combine, something new can be born that merges the best democratic ideals of all. 
Conclusion: Democracy for Natural Objects? 
Christopher Stone has been vindicated by history in his 1972 assertion that we should treat 
natural entities as legal entities. He called for a new myth of environmental consciousness, in 
which a scientific and ecological understanding of human nature would lead to the treatment 
of natural objects as part of our own body, our life support system: 
...I do not think it too remote that we may come to regard the Earth, as some have 
suggested, as one organism, of which Mankind is a functional part—the mind, 
perhaps: different from the rest of nature, but different as a man’s brain is from his 
lungs (Stone 1972: 52). 
As we have seen, environmental philosophy has moved on from this perspective, arguing not 
only that natural entities are part of our global life support system, but that humanity need not 
be the mind of the planet, should see itself as primus inter pares rather than as guiding 
intelligence. Humans may be the species possessed of the greatest intentionality, but this does 
not automatically entitle us to the most power, nor should humans only care for the rights of 
nature when it is in our interests to do so. A healthy democracy of objects is both within us 
and without us: where does the body end and the environment begin? Human life composes, 
and is composed by the environment, and the acknowledgement of this reality will bring 
holistic benefits. 
The democracy of objects offers the intellectual catalyst needed to confront the 
unthinkability of riparian personhood, and its enshrinement in our juridical frameworks. This 
will be and must be an on-going conversation, and yet the tools that will enable its resolution 
or evolution reside in all corners of discourse. The collected disciplines of the Humanities 
have their own perspectives to add to this conversation, informing the growing sociological, 
15 
 
scientific, policy, and juridical developments that continue to enrich the study of water. 
Future human life on Earth cannot continue without reforms to environmental management, 
and these reforms would be impoverished if non-human entities were excluded from the 
ranks of the enfranchised. Just as it is necessary to reform democracies failing to cater for the 
needs of their citizens, so too must the international legal framework expand the list of those 
to be catered for. A person, natural or juridical, has intrinsic rights regardless of their ability 
to contribute in the discourse of power. If a human being is treated in an unjust and 
unrepresentative fashion, lawmakers would likely consider this to be a failure of the 
democratic process. It is now necessary to push through a perceptual paradigm that does not 
apply the same logic to the non-human world. Bringing natural entities into the multitude 
strengthens the body politic, and creates a more vigorous future democracy. Human life on 
Earth stands and falls with the environment, and all democracies must account for this reality 
within the framework of the law.  
Human cultures—in diverse forms—invest emotional energy in bodies of water. In a 
region such as the Asia-Pacific where water is both lifeblood—the great rivers of East and 
South-East Asia—and dangerous destroyer—the typhoon, the flood, the tsunami—fear and 
respect have led to potent personifications. The journey to new modes of personhood 
continues. As this journey progresses, water must become more than a neoliberal resource, 
more than an object of western law and philosophy, and more than the generic 
homogenisation of culture that results from rampant globalisation. Many voices must be 
heard, those previously subaltern peoples, faded cultural ideologies, and alternate human and 
natural democratic ideals. The problem of water democracy is global, and yet the solution is 
partially be regional and local. New hydro-social arrangements require a nuanced balance 
between sweeping reform and local difference, between the overarching mechanisms of 
capitalism and democracy, and social transactions that respect the history of the hydro-social 
cycle (Schmidt 2014) and its regional and cultural plurality (Strang 2014). 
There is a further step that legislators may take beyond the recognition of natural 
objects as juridical persons, and it may continue to be a challenge for many years to come. 
Beautiful natural entities have an advantage, because humans are motivated to care for them 
by our innate sense of biophilia. Cute animals appeal to us, for example, because they remind 
us of our own young, and thus we feel affection for them. Humans feel affective ties to flora 
or fauna that are pleasing to the eye or fascinating to science, but what of the ugly and the 
abject? Is an entity that is displeasing to a human being by virtue of its appearance or 
behaviour any less deserving of protection? What of the parasites, the weeds, the hideous 
denizens of the ocean trenches, or those members of the animal or plant kingdom that behave 
in a manner that a society or societies abhor? Perhaps the process of legal enfranchisement 
will help in this respect, as will an increased awareness of diverse cultural beliefs, for an 
entity with rights cannot be mistreated or ignored in the same way as forms of life that are 
both distasteful and uninteresting to humans. This may be the next great discourse on the 
unthinkable, equally dependent on global and local factors for success. 
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